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From the Editor

We are pleased to present another issue of De Ethica. The contributions in this issue approach ethics from a range of perspectives, including politics, theology, philosophy, history and more practical as well. Even though they address different problems, the articles share an interest in the conditions that enable people to live, act, and exercise judgment *together*. Themes such as religious plurality in the public sphere, Christian responses to migration, the critical potential of political philosophy, and the ethical demands of educational practice are explored. Across these contributions, questions of difference, equality, freedom, recognition, and responsibility repeatedly emerge. These are inherently important topics and continue to be present in a pressing manner. Together, they provide new insights regarding the shared human condition and the world we live in.

In "Plurality and Religious Diversity: An Arendtian Argument for Religious Co-existence in the Public Sphere," Jan-Olav Henriksen draws on Hannah Arendt to offer a positive account of religious plurality. Rather than treating religion primarily as a set of doctrines or beliefs, the article presents religious traditions as clusters of practices expressed through speech and action—and therefore as forms of participation in a shared world. Henriksen argues that Arendt's conception of plurality shows why religious diversity should be valued in political and social life, not merely tolerated as an unavoidable fact. Plurality is compatible with equality: empirical differences among people coexist with the politically constituted equality of rights. Accordingly, the article stresses the importance of the "right to have rights," especially for those excluded from effective political membership. It also examines how religiously legitimated nationalism can suppress plurality by privileging one group and reducing others to generic categories. In its constructive theological reflections, the article argues that religious identities develop through relationships and that encounters with religious others can shape a tradition's self-understanding. Religious difference must therefore never justify unequal rights. Instead, a viable public sphere must enable distinct religious traditions and individuals to participate through speech and action as equals in a shared political world.

In their article "Christian Ethics and Migration in Germany and the United States: Toward a Comparative Taxonomy," Gary Slater and Marianne Heimbach-Steins put forward a framework for comparing the Christian social-ethical debates on migration in Germany and the United States. Instead of presenting one particular German or American viewpoint, they wish to promote more interaction between two major areas of scholarly work which have hitherto been only weakly connected. Their taxonomy divides these discussions into problems, impulses, and approaches, all of them being based on the fundamental Christian distinction between stranger and neighbor. The problems are the specific injustices or shortcomings that ethical consideration addresses and can vary by national setting. Among the topics they examine are borders, irregular migration, church-state relations, and the special significance of integration in Germany. The impulses indicate the direction of ethical arguments: a harmonizing impulse aims to reform legal

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and political systems in accordance with Christian ethical principles, while a dismantling impulse highlights the gap between Christian solidarity and existing systems of exclusion. The approaches concern the sources and forms of normative reasoning; Slater and Heimbach-Steins distinguish between scriptural-hermeneutical, cosmopolitical, and spatial-phenomenological approaches. Given that it is offered as a first draft and not as a final classification, the taxonomy is intended to make clear both the similarities and the differences between the two scholarly traditions. It gives Christian ethicists a common vocabulary with which to recognize similarities, state their disagreements more accurately, and deal with basic questions concerning belonging, identity, and the relationship between strangers and neighbors.

In his article "Is Hegel's Philosophy an Algebra of Revolution? Rediscovering the Ethical Impulse in Political Philosophy", Eirik Hasvik examines a key paradox concerning G. W. F. Hegel's political legacy: how can a philosopher who is frequently depicted as an advocate of the Prussian state at the same time have inspired radical critics and revolutionaries? To answer this question, Hasvik makes use of Hegel's well-known assertion that the rational is actual and the actual is rational. Rather than viewing this statement as a simple acceptance of present institutions, Hasvik emphasizes the difference between simple reality and actuality. According to Hegel's own usage, something is actual only when its existence matches its rational essence. This distinction creates a critical opportunity for judging whether or not institutions provide freedom, reciprocity, and recognition. The article sets out this argument in the context of Hegel's theory of ethical life and looks at the divisions that subsequently appeared among the right, the center, and the left Hegelians. It also looks at the conservative, progressive, and apparently neutral interpretations of the proposition. Hasvik ultimately endorses the progressive interpretation but does not present Hegel's recommendations on institutions as a political blueprint for today. Hegel's lasting importance, on the other hand, stems from the dynamic and critical nature of his philosophy; its ethical impulse requires that existing social arrangements constantly show that they are rational and promotes reflection on how political reality might become freer and more fully rational.

In his article "Pedagogical Tact as an Ethical Practice", Thomas Senkbeil defines pedagogical tact as practical judgment guided by ethical considerations and applied in situations of uncertainty. Drawing on Theodor W. Adorno's ideas about tact, Senkbeil argues that tact becomes especially significant when social conventions still influence behavior but no longer command unquestioned authority. Teachers are constantly confronted with individual and unpredictable circumstances in which general rules, theoretical knowledge and established methods by themselves are unable to tell them what the correct response should be. Pedagogical tact allows them to deal with this gap without reducing their professional actions to mere intuitive guesses. It involves being sensitive to issues of vulnerability, diversity and recognition, as well as to the changing boundaries between closeness and distance, between support and autonomy, and between individual and collective needs. Using insights from phenomenology, sociology, anthropology and aesthetics, Senkbeil presents tact as a principle of differentiation: educators must be able to perceive differences without putting learners into stigmatizing or exclusivity-based categories. This is especially relevant in the fields of special and inclusive education, where diagnostic and normative distinctions can affect opportunities for participation. The article also looks at how teacher education can help develop tact. Because it cannot be taught as a fixed technique, academic study, practical placements, case-based learning, mentoring, and structured reflection can promote its development. Pedagogical tact therefore connects

theory and practice, enabling educators to respond responsibly to the unique character of each educational situation while at the same time protecting the dignity and integrity of the learners.

Per Sundman has reviewed Rochelle DuFord's book *Solidarity in Conflict: A Democratic Theory*, in which a non-ideal democratic theory concerned with solidarity organizations is presented. The book makes a distinction between democratic, non-pathological solidarity and pathological forms which reproduce domination and exclusion. Sundman welcomes the originality of the account, especially the difference drawn between liberal solidarity with oppressed people and democratic solidarity carried out by oppressed groups themselves. Nevertheless, he is doubtful about whether labeling unjust solidarity as "pathological" hides the normative ground of this distinction and whether the book can consistently steer clear of ideal theory. He also maintains that the account of democracy does not place sufficient emphasis on collective self-government. Although he has these reservations, Sundman regards the study as an important and highly recommendable addition to our understanding of the relationship between solidarity and democratic political activity.

Fredrik Stjernberg examines Linda M. G. Zerilli's *A Democratic Theory of Truth*, a work that addresses post-truth politics and the declining confidence in the difference between truth and falsehood. Drawing primarily on Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zerilli argues that democratic truth should allow space for opinion and disagreement without slipping into relativism. Stjernberg describes the book as well-informed and carefully argued, but he doubts the distinction that Zerilli draws between subjective truth and an excessive emphasis on objective truth. According to him, scientific facts rarely lead to political action on their own; it is only their practical consequences that require judgment and debate. Stjernberg also raises the question of whether the book's advanced philosophical framework properly takes account of the real forces behind current post-truth discourse, although he acknowledges that it contains a good deal of genuine interest.

We hope you find the readings interesting and thought-provoking.

Martin Langby, Executive Editor