De Ethica - A Journal of Philosophical, Theological, and Applied Ethics De Ethica seeks to publish scholarly works in philosophical, theological, and applied ethics.
Copyright (c) 2026 Martin Langby https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2025 Johanna Romare https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2025 Lars Lindblom https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2025 Alexandra Lebedeva https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Book Review: Ryan, Cheyney. Pacifism as War Abolitionism. Routledge, 2024, 212 pp.
Book Review: Confucian relationism and Global ethics: Alternative Models of Ethics and Axiology in Times of Global Crises
Copyright (c) 2026 Xin Mao https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Seeking Asylum, Not Looking for Being the Scapegoat
The ethical and political discourse about asylum-seeking is often dominated by two fundamental questions: Firstly, should all humans have a human right to asylum? Secondly, are the duties corresponding with this claim even fulfillable for a state? From an ethical perspective, attempts to answer these questions by searching for an ethical justification of a human right to asylum respectively of corresponding state responsibilities could rely on the model of ethical decision-making SAMBA. The Ethics-SAMBA, which aims to provide concrete guidance for ethical decision-making with ease and argumentative elegance in four steps, is applied and results in an ethical justification based on the principle of vulnerability for the human right to asylum. Beyond that, it shows why the duties corresponding with the human right to asylum for a state need to be fulfilled – even if they are demanding and challenging. Finally, it presents some ethical arguments why the distinction between humans fleeing, seeking asylum, and humans migrating as well as borders per se are arbitrary and feudal, and this ethical analysis results in concrete proposals for concrete appropriate action.
Copyright (c) 2026 Peter Kirchschläger https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Book Review: Joerg Rieger & Terra Schwerin Rowe (eds.) Liberating People, Planet, and Religion: Intersections of Ecology, Economics, and Christianity.
Copyright (c) 2026 Gary Slater https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Book Review: Cherry, Myisha. Failures of Forgiveness: What We Get Wrong and How to Do Better. Princeton University Press, 2023, 240 pp.
Copyright (c) 2025 Vaishali Singh https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Post- and decolonial approaches reveal colonial patterns in political practice, in thinking - and in norms. Also, Human rights are the subject of this criticism. The article traces and discusses three central lines of this criticism: the question of the holders of human rights, the problem of economic inequality and the accusation of individualism. The central thesis is that post- and decolonial criticism uncovers problems in human rights theory and practice and that this criticism should be taken seriously for the sake of human rights. This is because it can strengthen their credibility and assertiveness. A human rights claim framed and contextualized in this way is defended in the article.
Copyright (c) 2025 Michelle Becka https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
This article demonstrates how ethics, understood as the theoretical analysis of morality, contribute to the discussion of disagreements over human rights. It starts with an elaboration on the disagreements between proponents of human rights and proceeds to disagreements between human rights proponents and sceptics. It is argued that there are strong reasons to endorse pluralism of human rights. This endorsement includes both ideational disagreements and material conflicts. However, it does not prevent us from defending human rights as a powerful emancipatory project. Open normative universalism, which views moral as well as legal human rights as socially constructed, is presented as an ethical position that secures the democratic dimension of human rights.
Copyright (c) 2025 Elena Namli https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
This article offers a moral and logical critique of human rights minimalism, by which is meant an account that restricts human rights to a level of sufficiency above or beyond which inequalities have no moral relevance, and which makes duties prior to rights, such that rights are dependent on assumed or actual institutional capacities. The argument is that human rights minimalism fails by its own standards – to represent moral equality – on two counts. First, it is predicated on a principle of moral equality of human beings, yet can produce no arguments against even the starkest inequalities of living conditions. Second, by making rights a dependent variable to the reasonableness of duties, what rights people have will in effect be the product of contingent institutional capacities. For a truly egalitarian commitment to human rights, minimalism is the wrong philosophy. A point made is that inequality is politically constructed, and institutional capacities will partly be a function of such constructed inequalities. Any reasonable account of human rights needs to have resources within itself to criticise those constructed inequalities that negatively affect institutional capacities to protect and promote rights. With inspiration from Anderson’s analysis of the point of equality, it is argued here that human rights have a dual rationale: a negative one to end oppression, and a positive one to establish a political culture of democratic equality.
Copyright (c) 2025 Lena Halldenius https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Human Rights Project and the Limits of Cosmopolitan Rights
This essay argues for a critical reconsideration of cosmopolitan human rights and of the post-Cold War Human Rights Project. It begins by contextualizing cosmopolitan rights in their historical and ideological context, showing that they are deeply complicit in a broader regime of neoliberal global governance, helping to justify and to depoliticize new modalities of coercive conditionality that characterize that regime. It shows how specific features of cosmopolitan rights contribute directly to this form of indirect rule and opines that present indifference or hostility toward human rights can and should be understood in part as a product of this complicity and of the wider failures of neoliberal global governance. The essay concludes with some reflections on the study of backlash against human rights amidst the real threat of rising ethno-nationalism and fascistic politics.
Copyright (c) 2025 Michael Goodhart https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Three Limitations of Reflective Equilibrium’s Justificatory Claims
John Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium (RE) offers a non-foundationalist framework for moral and political justification by harmonizing considered judgments and principles through iterative recalibration. Positioned as a response to value pluralism and normative conflict, RE foregrounds coherence and internal consistency as its epistemic ideals. On three interlinked grounds, this paper offers a critical examination of RE. First, RE’s reliance on moral intuitions can obscure the socio-historical construction of moral sensibilities. This effectively undermines the claims of universal moral justification. Second, in absence of external normative anchors, its procedural dynamism risks justificatory circularity. Third, RE assumes equal degree of epistemic accessibility to everyone that is unevenly allocated across social situations, favouring individuals possessing the cognitive, educational, and material resources required for prolonged contemplation. This asymmetry renders RE susceptible to epistemic exclusion, marginalizing subaltern moral imaginaries and reinforcing dominant normative frameworks. Consequently, RE’s epistemic architecture narrows it aspiration to pluralism.
Copyright (c) 2026 Anoop Kumar Suraj, C. Upendra https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Book Review: Wilk, Thomas and Gimbel, Steven: In on the Joke: The Ethics of Humor and Comedy. De Gruyter, 2024, 144 pp.
Copyright (c) 2025 Chris Kramer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Capability Approach as a Normative Framework for Urban Biodiversity Management
The Capability Approach (CA) has since the 1990s become one of the most influential theories of justice. It has been proven to be helpful for analysing both questions of social, environmental and multispecies justice. This article contributes to the debate on the usefulness of the CA in the context of ecological sustainability by evaluating its appropriateness as a normative framework for urban biodiversity management. The paper concludes that in its present form, it is uncertain whether the CA is suitable as a normative framework in this context. Its multidimensional view of human welfare can be considered a strong point, but there are also important unresolved issues. There are reasons for considering a redefinition of the concept of capability as it is problematic to apply to animals and even more so to plants. Finally, the question of whether collective entities should be considered for their own sake within the CA challenges the ethical individualism that is a core assumption in most formulations of the CA.
Copyright (c) 2026 Anders Melin https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Is there a human right to reasons for administrative decisions?
When public employees make administrative decisions affecting individuals, they exercise governmental power. The subjects affected by these decisions are often in a vulnerable position, generating an asymmetrical power relationship, which is why reason-giving – justifications – for administrative decisions serves a central role in communicating why a certain decision was taken. The aims of this article are to clarify the legal and philosophical reasons why public authorities have an obligation to justify the decisions they make and explore whether providing reasons for decisions can be seen as a human right. We do this by critically examining the obligation's legal and moral foundations, and we subsequently discuss to what extent it is reasonable to consider it a human right to have decisions justified. We conclude that when sufficient reasons for a decision are missing, the affected individual is deprived of crucial information, impairing their capacity to assess on what grounds the decision was taken, which we argue is a violation of their right to moral autonomy and self-government, and ultimately a violation of their right to justification.
Copyright (c) 2026 Johanna, Johanna, Olof https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Human Rights Complicity in Contemporary Manifestations of Racism
In the article, I examine how the ideologization of human rights contributes to their complicity in contemporary forms of racism by rendering racism invisible and overlooking the risks of indirect discrimination. The analysis is contextualized by an examination of the political discourse surrounding Sweden’s efforts to combat honor-based violence, where human rights and gender equality are invoked. I argue that their invocation can be interpreted as an example of the ideologization of human rights through nationalistic rhetoric and politics, with human rights being framed as “Swedish values.” This interpretation of human rights risks limiting their critical potential, turning human rights into a tool for self-justification and domination rather than a genuine framework for addressing social injustices.
Copyright (c) 2026 Alexandra Lebedeva https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The climate protests of Last Generation have not only garnered widespread attention but also sparked significant criticism. A key argument against their actions is that they undermine democratic processes and therefore pose a threat to democracy. Such critiques frame the group’s environmental concerns as being in opposition to their critics’ concerns for democracy. In this paper, we explore how this perceived tension between climate protection and democracy can be addressed. Drawing on ethical, legal, and human rights perspectives, we argue that this conflict cannot be resolved by simply prioritizing one side over the other. Instead, each of these perspectives affirms that both climate protection and democracy are fundamental values, state objectives, and legal principles. Consequently, we argue that the best way to address this tension is to fundamentally reframe the debate itself. Instead of asking whether “democracy or climate protection” should take priority, we should emphasize their interdependence and synergies—shifting toward a “democracy and climate protection” framework. To support this argument, we draw on Robin Celikates’ concept of radical democratic civil disobedience, which allows us to perceive Last Generation’s protest actions as a struggle for both climate justice and democracy.
Copyright (c) 2025 Max Tretter, Analucia Löschcke Centeno https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2024 Lars Lindblom, Johanna Romare https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2024 Lars Lindblom https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2024 Lea Chilian, Michael Coors https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
In this paper, I explore the potentials of the Gandhian conceptual framework for proposing strategies to reduce tensions among communities and nations, and to reconcile broken relations. The analysis focuses on three major Gandhian concepts such as i) ahimsa which denotes nonviolence, ii) satyagraha which signifies non-cooperation and civil disobedience, and iii) antyodaya which implies concern for the disadvantaged and victims. First, the discussion attempts to identify the methods proposed by the Gandhian framework for avoiding potential conflicts that might lead to violence. The paper examines manifold implications of the concept of nonviolence and elucidates both the merits and limits of the concept in contemporary contexts. Secondly, the paper analyses the feasibility of the strategy of nonviolent non-cooperation, which compels parties involved in the conflict to look for possible solutions. Thirdly, the paper elucidates the possibility of drawing substantial support from Gandhian thought to defend our obligation to be on the side of victims of aggressions and transgressions. Finally, the paper evaluates the constraints of the Gandhian framework in responding to sudden and unanticipated crises, its excessive demandingness, and the problem of impossible possibilities.
Copyright (c) 2025 George Kodimattam Joseph https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Reconciliation Across Religious/Political Borders
The question of reconciliation within the legacy of the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina presents religious ethicists with a challenge. A promising resource for this challenge lies in the relationship between religious and political borders, which complements the formal, juridical character of transitional justice. The religious/political borders relationship does not apply to all reconciliation-related cases, yet it does bear on cases in which religious/political identities overlap and questions of sovereign territoriality are at issue. The Bosnian conflict not only fulfills these criteria; its legacy reveals it as a harbinger of contemporary changes in norms associated with sovereignty. Because of their background in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, these changes can be labeled ”toxic Westphalianism,” in which adherence to Westphalian norms remains, even as its anchoring distinctions have become unmoored. These claims suggest two further contributions to the ethical engagement with reconciliation. First, the historical approach demonstrates the value of tracing reconciliation to its roots. Second, self-conscious attention to religious-political relations carves out a distinct and important role for religious ethics, which is uniquely placed to navigate between internal and external borders of a religious tradition and promote better forms of public and interfaith engagement.
Copyright (c) 2025 Gary Slater https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Memorials and monuments can help us to create a common history, to keep the past alive. However, when it comes to the process of reconciliation memorials and monuments can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand memorials can ensure a public awareness of our common history, of what has happened. Memorials ensure that misdeeds will not be forgotten too easily; the perpetrators cannot simply demand that the victims forget in the name of the common future. On the other hand, memorials can have the effect that we remember all too well, that we linger in a victim identity, which freezes history and, in this aspect, closes the future. This article analyses the uses of memorials and monuments and describes how memory is an essential part of a process of reconciliation. Memorials and monuments are not static expressions. In fact, monuments can turn into offensive statements, and the question here is how to deal with this? Is the solution to tear them down, to erect counter-monuments or to use them to illustrate the development of history? All these questions are asked in the context of how memorials and monuments can influence the process of reconciliation positive and negatively.
Copyright (c) 2025 Hans Vium Mikkelsen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
In this article, I critically examine the role of testimony in the work of truth commissions and its implications for understanding human rights violations and testimony drawing on Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of testimony. Two key implications emerge from this analysis. First, by applying a tort model, human rights violations are depoliticized through their individualization. This approach turns testimonies into evidence, limiting their critical potential. Depoliticization involves overlooking the political context of violence, which results in a failure to consider power dynamics, potentially reinforcing the same power structures that contributed to the atrocities in the first place. Second, the rationale behind truth commissions, often framed as "giving a voice to the voiceless", tends to prioritize the act of speaking over the moral obligation to listen to testimonies and reflect on one's moral and political responsibilities. Finally, I argue that addressing past human rights violations and their root causes should be guided by an idea of responsibility, particularly the responsibility for justice. The way truth commissions utilize testimony may hinder the fulfillment of this responsibility.
Copyright (c) 2024 Alexandra Lebedeva https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Reconciliation is a central concept in theology and in political and legal reconciliation processes where these different discourses intertwine. However, while in theology reconciliation is often a unilateral process with God as the primary actor, the situation is quite different in the worldly contexts. This article asks if and how reconciliation as a relational process is practically possible in the context of solving violent conflicts, the particular focus being on equality, respectively inequality, between the participating parties. The question is analyzed in relation to postcolonial reconciliation processes in involving the Sámi population in the Nordic countries and to the use of restorative justice in cases of domestic violence against women. With the help of Paul Ricoeur’s notion of complex equality and Ricoeur’s and Tore Johnsens models of reconciliation the paper argues that while reconciliation is a conceptual opportunity it also holds potential for practical opportunities, in particular if the evident challenges are taken into account.
Copyright (c) 2024 Heidi Jokinen, Björn Vikström https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Book Review: Patel, Leigh. Decolonizing Educational Research: From Ownership to Answerability. Routledge, 2016, 120 pp.
Leigh Patel’s work on decolonizing educational spaces provides a glimpse into an important transcendental motif in decolonial studies: that decolonization must be visible in the structure of being as such. I argue in this book review that the specific ontological picture provided, what I call a “Decolonial Deleuzean” view, implies a one-and-many relationship characterizable by what one scholar has called a “vegetal” ontology, the human social coordinate system in the metaphor of “the plant that is not one.” I argue further that this view fails to provide a believable picture of specifically human decolonial belonging in its ontological register by claiming that the plant metaphor provides an inappropriate one-and-many relationship to actual human spaces. “Decolonial Deleuzean” education therefore reintroduces the very exclusivity criterion it is designed to eliminate. I provide, finally, a psychoanalytical correction, one which is compatible with the decolonial project, but strictly speaking, not the Deleuzean one.
Copyright (c) 2025 Marko Vučković https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Von theologischer wir philosophischer Seite wird bisweilen gefordert, Vergebung müsse unbedingt sein. Darüber hinaus wird bei Psychotherapeuten die therapeutische Wirkung der Vergebung betont, so dass Vergebung im Eigeninteresse der gekränkten oder geschädigten Personen zu liegen scheint. Dabei werden Gesichtspunkte der Gerechtigkeit und der Prävention und der Selbstachtung des Opfers übersehen, wie die im Artikel aufgezeigten Vorbehalte deutlich machen können. Dabei kommt speziell die Perspektive der Geschädigten, der Opfer stärker in den Blick. Außerdem sind die einschlägigen Mahnungen im Neuen Testament, die die Unbedingtheit der Forderung nach Vergebung zu bestätigen scheinen, bei genauer Betrachtung durchaus differenzierter.
Copyright (c) 2024 Werner Wolbert https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
To have moral standing to blame is to have a right to blame. But what kind of right is it, and what follows from having or lacking standing? I will argue that moral standing to blame should be understood as a power according to Wesley Hohfeld’s classification of rights (1913). It is a normative power to call for an uptake of blame from someone who is liable to blame, i.e., someone who is blameworthy. The function of standing norms, I will argue, is to protect the freedom and interests of persons who are or could be blamed. I make three further claims in distinction to recent scholarship on standing: I argue that the concept of standing does not apply at all to private blame, only to expressed blame; I claim that standing cannot be understood as only a privilege-right; and I argue that there is not a conceptual asymmetry between standing to blame and standing to forgive.
Copyright (c) 2025 David Chelsom Vogt https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Reconciliation in Workplace Bullying Contexts
The purpose of this article is to discuss reconciliation in workplace bullying contexts. Bullying is a complex and subtle phenomenon that appears in multilayered workplace contexts, which makes reconciliation a controversial issue. What might reconciliation mean in escalated and deeply harmful bullying processes in ordinary workplaces? By discussing this question, I also address the urgent ethical question of justice and the distribution of responsibilities in reconciliatory processes. Drawing from previous research on bullying interventions, primarily focusing on the views of interventions by HR professionals, I trace underlying assumptions about reconciliation and the human beings involved. These tend to be derived from endeavors for financial gain and virtues like efficiency and predictability. As an alternative frame to an individualist approach that seem to be silently operative in the intervention discourse, I seek to explore the ontological imagery of the social body. From there, I elaborate on potential implications of what reconciliation could mean in a workplace bullying context. Resisting the efficiency and predictability of fixed procedures, I suggest organic, social restorative processes of renarration, responsibility, and grace, from within which reconciliation may appear as one among other potential outcomes.
Copyright (c) 2024 Mikael Nilsson https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Why Two Recent Attempts to Rescue Constitutive Luck Do Not Work
According to Rescher, luck is chancy, but constitution is not, and so constitutive luck is a contradiction in terms. In this paper, I look at two recent attempts to controvert this argument. According to the first, constitution is not chancy, but neither is moral luck, because moral luck is not a species of luck. According to the second, moral luck is chancy, but constitution is too, because the comparative class is not the agent herself but rather the population at large. I argue that neither of these attempts is successful. I begin by explaining the importance of constitutive luck.
Copyright (c) 2025 Samuel Kahn https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2023 Lars Lindblom https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2023 Michael Coors, Lea Chilian https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2023 Lars Lindblom, Per Sundman https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Permaculture as Richard Bauckham’s Living with Other Creatures:
Copyright (c) 2025 Troy Bierma https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Towards Artificial Wildlife: Speciesism and Intelligent Machines
During the recent debates on the spread of artificial intelligence (AI), fears have been expressed about the possible dominance of intelligent machines over humans. In this article we explore the foundations on which this dystopian perspective of the threat to human sovereignty posed by the development of AI has been based. The research hypothesis is that the idea of the potential (future) supremacy of intelligent and ultraintelligent machines is based on the same intelligence-driven prejudice as represented by the theory of speciesism. If machines are seen as a new species, they not only differ from non-human animals but also follow a reverse course of development, regarding their relationship with man. Following this line of thought, we claim that a gradual ‘undomestication’ of machines is witnessed; a transition to a new state, which is further evidenced through the examination of the concepts of “autonomy” and “consciousness”. Finally, it is argued that the theoretical background to study and interpret scenarios about machine dominance over humans is already here. It is applied in the field of ethics and in particular, of environmental ethics.
Copyright (c) 2025 Spyridon Stelios, Georgios Sakellariou https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
In an age in which anthropocentrism is increasingly under fire, the investment of the artistic tradition in that paradigm deserves particular attention. Portraiture is especially significant, as it seems to be the anthropocentric art form par excellence. It seems to reinforce key features of anthropocentrism: the distinction of the human from the nonhuman and the superiority of the former over the latter. We can pursue these questions most effectively if we distinguish descriptive (“weak”) anthropocentrism from normative (“strong”) anthropocentrism. The former involves some sort of focus on humans, the latter combines this with claims about their superiority over the nonhuman. Certain works by influential portraitists, such as Pablo Picasso, Frida Kahlo, and Ana Mendieta, contest both weak and strong anthropocentrism. Other portraits seem to be involved in weak anthropocentrism, but not necessarily strong anthropocentrism. Considering the artwork of Alice Neel and the philosophy of Judith Butler, I argue that such works have an important ethical role to play in orienting us in our relationships with humans, precisely in resisting strong anthropocentrism even in expressing weak anthropocentrism.
Copyright (c) 2023 Stephen Bush https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Theological and Ethical Perspectives on Rethinking the Co-existence of Flourishing and Vulnerability
The aim of this article is to explore the evolving discussion surrounding vulnerability and flourishing. This conversation has gained significant relevance in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and amid global uncertainties, including the effects of violence and war-trauma. The central idea here is to reconsider vulnerability and flourishing not simply as universal experiences tied to one's own humanity and social context, but rather as co-existing, interdependent, and contingent aspects of human existence. Without proposing that human flourishing is conditioned by vulnerability, this perspective seeks to challenge the notion that vulnerability and flourishing are fundamentally separate. The following discussion will not only examine vulnerability and flourishing as theoretical concepts but will also address their practical significance as integral components of the human experience, and how they intersect in a real-life situation. It's important to note that both vulnerability and flourishing are influenced by specific contexts and circumstances, including personal, social, economic and cultural factors. In the course of this discussion, I will provide examples to illustrate these points. The first section will focus on vulnerability, while the second will delve into the concept of flourishing from a Christian perspective, drawing on Miroslav Volf's ideas about a flourishing life.
Copyright (c) 2024 martina vuk https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
This paper presents a social-theologically informed interpretation of the term integrity, as it occurs in fundamental law. It explores the manifestations of integrity violations and proceeds to draw an inference: an integrity violation can directly emanate from a misconception regarding integrity itself, as well as the implementation of protective measures that follow it. Integrity in its wholeness dimension is understood as open-endedness and non-seclusion rather than as a substantial, clearly definable characteristic of a person. This open-endedness and non-seclusion results from the relational constitution of an individual. Consequently, it follows that a violation of integrity occurs when the open-endedness and non-seclusion of a person and their relational Becoming is hindered. The new definition of integrity is particularly important when it comes to the governance of new health technologies, especially Digital Twins that can become representatives of a person. Human integrity is non-violated only when it is understood as open to relational Becoming and this Becoming shows its expression in the mutual enabling and support of self-articulation.
Copyright (c) 2023 Tabea Ott, Peter Dabrock https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Vulnerability as a critique of the one-sidedness of the principle of autonomy is at risk of overemphasizing the positive dimension of vulnerability. Moreover, in the discourse on vulnerability, the threat of dehumanization (or moral vulnerability) has not been scrutinized enough ethically. Therefore, the ethics of vulnerability is insufficient when faced with the force of war that requires the conceptualization of vulnerability for political-ethics. The Russian war in Ukraine demonstrates this weakness in a striking way: the called-for openness to the other as well as an active form of nonviolence, as promoted by Judith Butler, may not be an option in times of war. Continuing Jessica Benjamin’s psychoanalytic approach to mutual recognition, the essay shows that the task of morality does not rest upon broadening one’s vulnerability, but rather in understanding vulnerable agency as the dialectic of vulnerability and agency. For the further development of this dialectic, the triadic figuration is emphasized, complementing the dyadic relation of self and other. While the Third can take multiple figurations in the psychoanalytical setting, I understand the Third within the political-ethical context as the possibility of a “moral world” of nonviolence and respect. During war, the role of the bystander is to become a witness who, through the process of witnessing, advocacy, diplomacy, and justice, allows for the moral Third to reemerge. Among others, the ethics of vulnerability must spell out the price for the failure of taking on this responsibility, namely the eclipse of morality.
Copyright (c) 2023 Hille Haker https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
My focus on vulnerability and bioethics – which acknowledges but goes beyond mainstream feminist ethics - will take a phenomenological perspective that understands the self as having no meaning or existence beyond its embodiment. As such we are always open, and therefore vulnerable, to the constant changes of embodied experience. The transformations in embodiment are both necessary for development and continuous over the life course, but it is only when something breaks the cycle of normative development that the intimation of vulnerability and disorder arise. Corporeal disorder operates in a highly individual and differentiated way as it manifests, for example, in the experience of disability, pain, ageing and dying. These are not exceptional moments of vulnerability in a life otherwise secure and predictable, but they do clearly set out the limits of the western imaginary, and more particularly of modern western biomedicine and conventional healthcare. In offering a critique of the positivist enterprise of biomedicine, I want to suggest a different understanding of the embodiment that has radical implications for bioethics.
Copyright (c) 2024 Margrit Shildrick https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Self-determined Sex Work as Care Work Between Experiences of Integrity and Vulnerability
Sex work or prostitution marks a controversial topic for Protestant sexual ethics. It is also a multifaceted phenomenon because it can occur in very different forms: the spectrum ranges from poverty, emergency and procurement prostitution to the self-determined and insured sex worker with all imaginable shades in between. In the current economic system, goods and services are exchanged, traded, sold, acquired and paid for, so sex work can also be understood as work. For the purposes of this article, we will therefore start from an understanding of sex work as care work. Care work can be understood as the satisfaction of needs and interests of third parties and the self. If sex work is discussed as care work, this has a variety of consequences. These include the fact that questions of vulnerability and integrity come to the fore. Integrity can be comprehended as self-realisation or autonomy and thus as potentially vulnerable, taking up Axel Honneth’s early reflections on the issue of recognition. Integrity in Axel Honneth’s sense can - according to a first approximation - play a role for sex work on three levels: physical or corporeal level, structural level and lifestyle or way of life level. Finally, the essay discusses the concept of negotiated or consensual morality as a contribution of Protestant ethics.
Copyright (c) 2023 Sarah Jäger https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Vulnerability, Conscience, and Integrity
This essay explores how vulnerability, understood not as precarity but as capacious responsiveness, much as the Philosopher Judith Butler identifies it, and recognition are key moral concepts that are prior conditions for the expression of conscience. Appreciating Thomas Aquinas' argument that conscience is neither a power or a habit, but rather an act, the essay argues that Aquinas' inclination synderesis, that prompts us to the good and away from evil, functions in a way similar to vulnerability. Fundamentally, vulnerability prompts us to recognize the neighbor who needs our response.
Copyright (c) 2024 James Keenan https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2023 Lars Lindblom; Erik Gustavsson https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
In this paper I offer an argument for the thesis that evil activity, unlike its less extremely immoral counterparts, cannot endow the agent’s life with any measure of meaning. I first review two other important arguments for this thesis that can be drawn from the recent literature. I then articulate my own argument and show how it avoids the problems of these others. According to my argument, meaning-endowing activity cannot be of the worst sort, along any of the basic ways in which we evaluate activity, but evil activity is of the worst sort along one of these ways, namely, the moral one. Because it is grounded in a traditional concept of meaning for which there is much to be said, I note, my argument should hold broad appeal. I also note that my argument is consistent with various contemporary conceptions of evil activity.
Copyright (c) 2024 David Matheson https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Overcoming vulnerability by editing the germline?
The concept of vulnerability has become widely acknowledged as a fundamental concept for medical ethics and research ethics, yet rarely considered with respect to ethical assessments of human germline genome editing. A first aim of this paper is to make vulnerability ethics considerations fruitful for issues related to these technical innovations. The possibility of altering the genome promises to overcome forms of vulnerability inherently connected to our existence as physical beings and would hence allow to increase the resilience of human nature or even to move evolution forward by equipping people with new character traits and enhanced capabilities. I suggest a more fine-grained distinction of various applications purposes than the dichotomy of therapeutic and enhancement. I support the rejection of most application purposes as ‘therapeutic’ and claim that framing them as ‘therapeutic’ in the context of the current discursive constellation runs the risk of accentuating existing vulnerabilities. With respect to intergenerational responsibilities, I reject the view that editing the germline necessarily leads to corrupt intergenerational relations based on which it must be categorically excluded. I conclude that it is nevertheless important to take a very close look at the challenges that arise, especially from a vulnerability perspective, before irreversible facts are created overhastily.
Copyright (c) 2024 Michael Braunschweig https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
This study focuses on the question of how Muslim chaplains can, through their interventions, exert an influence on the situation of refugees, characterised by vulnerability and loss of home. Based on definitions in social work and anthropology studies, home can be conceptualised as a key anthropological need, comprised of spatial, temporal, relational and spiritual dimensions. Referring to an empirical study on asylum chaplaincy in Switzerland, this study analyses how five Muslim chaplains accompany refugees, how their styles of chaplaincy differ in practice and what effects their interventions have. These empirical results are then brought into conversation with a theoretical framework, to explore the connections between counselling and vulnerability. While it could be argued that referring to the vulnerable situation of refugees reinforces an image of passivity, the co-construction of a home represents a collaborative effort and empowers refugees by mobilising both forces and resources. Chaplains, in particular, can contribute to the relational and spiritual dimensions of home. For refugees, articulating their religious concerns and working together with Muslim chaplains, means they can address the limits of the existing asylum system and demand recognition of cultural diversity.
Copyright (c) 2023 Hansjörg Schmid https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Integrity, Vulnerability, and Temporality
This paper asks how to account for vulnerable integrity in the temporal dynamism of human lives without relying on a subtractive vision of integral human nature, borrowing from presumed past or future rationality and maturity, or depending on an external attribution of dignity. Illustrating the challenges with vignettes from the author’s life, it argues inductively that human integrity includes morally inviolable vulnerability to others with whom we are in interdependent relationship and without whom we cannot develop or maintain our selves. Others reside at the core of our integrity, for better and for worse, and we reside at theirs. Augustine’s accounts of memory, time, and the narrative self; Whiteheadian process thought’s understanding of continuity through change; and feminist theories of narrative all provide theological and philosophical justifications for this vision of integrity. John Wall’s and Johan Brännmark’s non-foundational approaches to integrity and human rights lead us to the same conclusion without entailing theological anthropological claims, ensuring its relevance in a pluralist culture.
Copyright (c) 2023 Cristina Traina https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
This paper argues that recent advancements in value theory can inform discussions on the interrelation of human rights. More precisely it is argued that the importance of human rights, i.e., the ranking of their priority, cannot be fully accounted for by “more important” and “equally as important”. The concept of “on a par importance” is introduced and it is argued that this concept captures implicitly held intuitions in the debate. Furthermore, with this new conceptual insight, it is possible to justify certain assumptions that previously lacked a justificatory ground.
Copyright (c) 2024 Henrik Andersson https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Epicurean Priority-setting During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Beyond
The aim of this article is to study the relationship between Epicureanism and pandemic priority-setting and to explore whether Epicurus's philosophy is compliant with the later developed utilitarianism. We find this aim interesting because Epicurus had a different way of valuing death than our modern society does: Epicureanism holds that death—understood as the incident of death—cannot be bad (or good) for those who die (self-regarding effects). However, this account is still consistent with the view that a particular death can be bad for everyone else but those who die, such as family, friends, and society (other-regarding effects). During the pandemic, the focus has been on the number of deaths more than on the suffering and reduced well-being of those infected and the rest of society. However, since the pandemic requires prioritization, it is, on a utilitarian account, important to consider priorities that do the most good overall. In this article, we approach the harm of death from an Epicurean point of view, seeking to flesh out potential implications for pandemic priority-setting, and healthcare in general, using a case study of COVID-19 priority-setting. We also explore whether this would conflict with utilitarianism. We conclude that an Epicurean pandemic priority-setting approach would be different but, surprisingly, not radically different from many of the actual priority-setting decisions we saw under the COVID-19 pandemic.
Copyright (c) 2023 Bjørn Hol, Carl Tollef Solberg https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Problem with Using a Maxim Permissibility Test to Derive Obligations
The purpose of this paper is to show that, if Kant’s universalization formulations of the Categorical Imperative are our only standards for judging right from wrong and permissible from impermissible, then we have no obligations. I shall do this by examining five different views of how obligations can be derived from the universalization formulations and arguing that each one fails. I shall argue that the first view rests on a misunderstanding of the universalization formulations; the second on a misunderstanding of the concept of an obligation; the third on a misunderstanding of the concept of a maxim; the fourth on a misunderstanding of the limits of action description; and the fifth on a misunderstanding of the universalization formulations again.
Copyright (c) 2022 Samuel Kahn https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Copyright (c) 2022 Lars Lindblom; Elena Namli https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
This article critically examines two different answers to the ancient question, why be moral. The first suggests that valid reasons refer to a specific relation between human beings and God. Here, being moral means to treat oneself and others with the respect that is the due of God’s closest friend. The second argues that we have good reasons for being moral when being moral makes us happy (realizes Eudaimonia). The investigation offers two results, one critical and the other constructive. The critical shows how and why both theistic accounts of bestowed human dignity and eudaimonistic accounts offer no relevant reasons for being moral. The constructive result builds on an observation; both accounts presuppose the inherent force of the obligation to act morally right. It shows that the reasons for being moral should be explicated as internal to the very meaning of being moral.
Copyright (c) 2024 Per Sundman https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has transgressed biomedical categories. According to Horton, it turned out to be a 'syndrome' that infected virtually all spheres of social life. The pandemic has created toxic social atmosphere highly unfavorable to clinical and clinic-ethical decision making. Constraints and pressures related to micro-, meso-, exo- and macro-environments framing doctors, nurses, and medical students in training were identified. These factors exacerbated moral distress (moral injury) amongst clinicians. In a joint Polish-Lithuanian project (IDUB 2020-2022) we examined predictors of moral distress in pandemic clinical contexts. A survey-based, real-time, correlational and comparative study was conducted in Poland and Lithuania after the first year of pandemic with N=227 participants. Unexpected differences on regular and pandemic-type moral distress levels were found between the two national samples. Polish participants showed significantly higher moral distress levels than their Lithuanian counterparts. The following article discusses these findings and recommends the reinforcement of resilient medical decision making.
Copyright (c) 2023 Nowak, Barciszewska, Kriaučiūnienė, Jakavonytė-Akstinienė, Napiwodzka, Mazur, Klimenko , Owen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Being Claimed in Immediate Response to an Other
In this essay, I propose a phenomenological alternative to the established candidates of what grounds moral status, namely the experience of being claimed in immediate response to an Other. Drawing from late-Wittgensteinian moral philosophy, I develop this alternative in critical juxtaposition to theories that aim to derive moral status from values grounded in independently accountable empirical properties. Against such theories, I expound how meaningful talk of moral status must instead be understood to be rooted in the individuals’ morally charged immediate responsiveness to Others, a responsiveness that preconditions the very possibility of separating value and fact. If my analysis is sound, then the empirical property or set of properties that is commonly taken to qualify as a candidate for a ground of moral status in fact presupposes a phenomenological dimension of ‘ethical encounter’. The recognition of this deeper phenomenological level would, while not disposing with the notion of moral status, transform its meaning and, thus, how much of the philosophical debate on moral status is conducted.
Copyright (c) 2023 Philip Strammer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
In this paper, I explore three theories of value to illuminate how nontheistic and theistic accounts may differ in grounding human dignity: neo- Aristotelian ethical naturalism, Kantian constructivism, and a theistic account of good simpliciter. The theistic account of good simpliciter that I offer adapts Robert Adams’s notion of the transcendent Good as the Excellent. In this account, I explain how Adams’ thesis that goodness is a property consisting in a sort of resemblance to God may be understood in a new way, using ideas drawn from contemporary mathematics and quantum mechanics. On my account, we must value human beings neither because such valuing would be beneficial or necessary for human flourishing nor because it is a logical outcome of anything we care to value. Rather it is because we recognize the property of self-similarity in all of us, which may be understood as a resemblance to God as good simpliciter.
Copyright (c) 2023 Kevin Jung https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
In defense of a ‘thick’ formal equality principle in healthcare resource distribution
Given resource constraints in healthcare, demands justice and equity require the constant development of material principles for resource distribution. In many cases, such material principles are formulated as mid-level principles, well-adapted to handle healthcare distribution but suffering from aspects outside the healthcare context that affect their application. In healthcare, factors outside the healthcare system will sometimes affect patients’ equal opportunity to receive treatment and achieve health. Examples of such factors might include an individual’s economic means, the cost of drugs, geography, etc. This article explores whether the formal equality principle could help us address such problems. It is argued that the traditional (thin) formal equality principle can aid in priority setting, both as a heuristic tool to aid in consistency and also in handling under-determined cases. However, it appears to be too ‘thin’ to handle problems caused by factors outside the healthcare context. In the article, I explore a more robust version of the formal equality principle and argue that such a principle can be used to address such cases. However, even a more comprehensive formal equality principle will need to consider whether some other actors have a moral responsibility to address the problem or whether the issue could be solved more effectively by others. Furthermore, such a principle needs to consider whether the opportunity cost of achieving ‘thick’ formal equality is acceptable, given the material principles of distribution.
Copyright (c) 2023 Lars Sandman https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Ectogenesis and the Moral Status of the Fetus
Many people believe the morality of abortion stands or falls with the moral status of the fetus. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist argument bypasses the question of fetal moral status; even if the fetus has a right to life, she argues the gestational mother has a right to disconnect herself from the fetus. However, should ectogenesis – a technology that would allow the fetus to develop outside the womb – become sufficiently advanced, the fetus would no longer need a gestational mother to live. Recently, Joona Räsänen has argued that parents have a right to secure the death of a fetus that has been removed from the mother’s body, and that this right might extend to infanticide. However, here I argue Räsänen’s position ignores the moral status of the fetus; if the fetus is morally comparable to beings like us, then of course parents lack a right to the death of their children. However, if the fetus is morally comparable to a tumor, then the right to kill it is philosophically uninteresting.
Copyright (c) 2022 William Simkulet https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Age is determined by the amount of time that someone or something has existed. For example, a person born in 1980 and a 1980 vintage wine would each be 40 years old in 2020. Recently, Joona Räsänen has challenged this belief, arguing that in some cases one’s age is not determined by how long one has existed, but by some feature or set of features about one’s biology, experiences, and/or beliefs about themselves. In many cases, age is an ad hoc indicator of physical health, psychological development, and the like, but for Räsänen, it seems age isn’t merely an indicator of such things; it’s derived from these things! Here I argue Räsänen’s alternatives to chronological age are ontologically burdensome and inconsistent with our intuitions in both normal and weird cases.
Copyright (c) 2024 William Simkulet https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Although egalitarianism has been the dominant orthodoxy in Anglophone social and political philosophy for many decades, there have been surprisingly few attempts to account for the axiom on which it rests, namely that human moral worth does not come in degrees. This article begins by rehearsing and evaluating two families of approaches to the grounding problem. The first favours accounts that seek to preserve consistency with metaphysical naturalism, while the second relies on more philosophically contentious claims about the metaphysical status of the human person. I then outline reasons for supposing that none of these accounts of basic equality offers a convincing theoretical foundation for egalitarianism. I conclude by sketching permutations of a theological account before arguing that one of these variations satisfies many of the explanatory criteria that a successful solution requires.
Copyright (c) 2023 James Orr https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Ethical Obligations of Global Justice in the Midst of Global Pandemics
This paper considers the obligation higher income countries have to lower and middle income countries during a global pandemic. Further considers which reforms are needed to the global supply-chain of medical resources. The short-comings in distribution and medical infrastructure have exacerbated the health crisis in developing countries. Global justice demands radical redistribution of medical resources in order to prevent mass casualties. This is argued first by highlighting that the COVID-19 pandemic should be acknowledged as an issue of global justice, secondly, higher income countries ought to account for distribution inequity as a matter of rectifying past injustices, and thirdly argue for reform in distribution while considering the vaccine rollout as a prime example. We aim to show how the differences from country to country in response capabilities are a result of the economic foundation colonialism established and a direct result of cyclical poverty, which wealthy countries perpetuate to this day.
Copyright (c) 2023 Sarah Hicks, Paula Gurtler https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Reciprocity as an Argument for Prioritizing Health Care Workers for the COVID-19 Vaccine
During the recent debates on whether to prioritize health care workers for COVID-19 vaccines, two main lines of arguments emerged: one centered on maximizing health and one centered on reciprocity. In this article, we scrutinize the argument from reciprocity. The notions of fittingness and proportionality are fundamental for the act of reciprocating. We consider the importance of these notions for various arguments from reciprocity, showing that the arguments are problematic. If there is a plausible argument for reciprocity during the pandemic, this is most likely one that centers on the risk that health care workers take on while working. We argue that the scope of this argument is not plausibly extended only to health care workers. Other essential workers at risk are in the position to make the same arguments. We also argue that there is no compelling argument from reciprocity that makes reciprocating with vaccines, rather than by other means, necessary. Furthermore, allocating vaccines based on reciprocity will conflict with utility-maximizing. Given the weak state of the arguments, overriding concerns for utility seem unreasonable.
Copyright (c) 2023 Mr., Dr. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Ethical analysis may result in recommendations for legal reform. This article discusses the problem of how academic researchers can go from ethical normative judgments to recommendations for law reform. It develops a methodological framework for what may be called ‘ethical transplants’: transplanting ethical normative judgments into legislation. It is an inventory of the issues that need to be addressed, but not a substantive normative theory. It may be especially helpful for Ph.D. students and beginning researchers working in interdisciplinary projects combining ethical and legal analysis. I distinguish three stages in the process from ethics to law: translation, transformation, and incorporation. The latter stage can be divided into three clusters of issues, these being legal, empirical, and normative ones. Most of the philosophical literature on the legal enforcement of morals focuses on the normative issues. My aim is to broaden the perspective in two ways. First, I show that this is only one relevant issue and that we should address legal and empirical issues and the processes of translation and transformation as well. Second, I argue that we should pay more attention to pluralism and variation.
Copyright (c) 2022 Wibren van der Burg https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Does Libertarian Self-Ownership Protect Freedom?
Many libertarians assume that there is a close relation between an individual’s self-ownership and her freedom. That relation needs questioning. In this article it is argued that, even in a pre-property state, self-ownership is insufficient to protect freedom. Therefore, libertarians who believe in self-ownership should either offer a defense of freedom that is independent from their defense of self-ownership, make it explicit that they hold freedom as second to self-ownership (and defend that position), or reconsider the moral basis of their political views.
Copyright (c) 2022 Jesper Ahlin Marceta https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
On Some Moral Implications of Linguistic Narrativism Theory
In this essay we consider the moral claims of one branch of non-realist theory known as linguistic narrativism theory. By highlighting the moral implications of linguistic narrativism theory, we argue that the “moral vision” expressed by this theory can entail, at worst, undesirable moral agnosticism if not related to a transcendental and supra-personal normativity in our moral life. With its appeal to volitionism and intuitionism, the ethical sensitivity of this theory enters into difficulties brought about by several internal tensions as to what morality and moral judgements involve. We contend that the proponents of linguistic narrativism theory must strongly recognize and take responsibility for the “moral vison” their theory professes, in so far as they want to think of their theory as a morally responsible one.
Copyright (c) 2020 Natan Elgabsi, Bennett Gilbert https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
‘What Do We Do with the Art of Monstrous Men?’ Betrayal and the Feminist Ethics of Aesthetic Involvement
The #MeToo movement has put a spotlight on sexual harassment and abuse in a number of industries, notably the arts. It has raised a set of questions about how to receive the artistic works of the accused, particularly when such work has been beloved or formative for an individual, and collectively when it has cultural significance and influence. Claire Dederer, writing in The Paris Review, posed the question bluntly in her piece, “What Do We Do with the Art of Monstrous Men?” This question, and the range of (often perplexed) responses to it, reveal the lack of adequate resources to evaluate responses to an artist’s actions that may bear on our aesthetic valuations of the artist’s work and that may be experienced as quite intimately personal. What do we do with the sense of betrayal that may follow on the discovery of an artist’s bad behavior? What are the implications of consuming of such art? What concepts and norms might help to guide reflection? These questions bear on the ethical significance of love and appreciation for artworks and artists, and, more broadly, the ethical consumption of artworks. This paper responds to these questions in two ways: first, it develops an account of “aesthetic involvement” to elaborate the sense of betrayal that may follow accusations or revelations of sexual harassment and abuse. Second, it proposes a feminist ethics of aesthetic involvement in response to such betrayals and to dilemmas about the individual and collective ethical consumption of artworks.
Copyright (c) 2020 Sarah Stewart-Kroeker https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Distributive Energy Justice and the Common Good
Recently, philosophers and social scientists have shown increased interest in questions of social, global, and intergenerational distributive justice related to energy production and consumption. However, so far there have been only a few attempts to analyse questions of distributive energy justice from a religious point of view, which should be considered a lack since religions are an important basis of morality for a large part of the world’s population. In this article, I analyse issues of distributive energy justice from a Christian theological viewpoint by employing the Catholic common good tradition as a theoretical framework. First, I present and argue for a global and ecological interpretation of the Catholic common good tradition. Then I analyse the implications of such an interpretation on questions of distributive energy justice, focusing on the view of property rights within the Catholic common good tradition. I conclude that, in comparison with Nussbaum’s liberal capabilities approach, the common good tradition provides stronger reasons for individuals and groups in more economically developed countries to share their resources and knowledge with individuals and groups in less economically developed countries.
Copyright (c) 2020 Anders Melin https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Violence, Shame, and Moral Agency – An Exploration of Krista K. Thomason’s Position
Krista Thomason’s account of shame explains the link between shame and violence as something that arises out of a tension between our identity and our self-conception: those things about which we feel shame are part of our identities, but they are not part of our self-conception. She sees violence as an attempt to regain agency and control and overcome shame. Although this is an important trait in shame, to explain violence as a response to the loss of agency is not sufficient. Furthermore, it cannot explain serious self-harm as the result of shame, since such reactions undermined the agency she holds that violence attempts to reclaim. Hence, these features need to be incorporated into a wider account of shame that sees it as a response to the interruption of intentional projects and attempts for coherent agency.
Copyright (c) 2020 Jan-Olav Henriksen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Moral agency without responsibility? Analysis of three ethical models of human-computer interaction in times of artificial intelligence (AI)
Philosophical and sociological approaches in technology have increasingly shifted toward describing AI (artificial intelligence) systems as ‘(moral) agents,’ while also attributing ‘agency’ to them. It is only in this way – so their principal argument goes – that the effects of technological components in a complex human-computer interaction can be understood sufficiently in phenomenological-descriptive and ethical-normative respects. By contrast, this article aims to demonstrate that an explanatory model only achieves a descriptively and normatively satisfactory result if the concepts of ‘(moral) agent’ and ‘(moral) agency’ are exclusively related to human agents. Initially, the division between symbolic and sub-symbolic AI, the black box character of (deep) machine learning, and the complex relationship network in the provision and application of machine learning are outlined. Next, the ontological and action-theoretical basic assumptions of an ‘agency’ attribution regarding both the current teleology-naturalism debate and the explanatory model of actor network theory are examined. On this basis, the technical-philosophical approaches of Luciano Floridi, Deborah G. Johnson, and Peter-Paul Verbeek will all be critically discussed. Despite their different approaches, they tend to fully integrate computational behavior into their concept of ‘(moral) agency.’ By contrast, this essay recommends distinguishing conceptually between the different entities, causalities, and relationships in a human-computer interaction, arguing that this is the only way to do justice to both human responsibility and the moral significance and causality of computational behavior.
Copyright (c) 2020 Alexis Fritz, Wiebke Brandt, Henner Gimpel, Sarah Bayer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2020 Elena Namli https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Moral Imaginative Resistance to Heaven: Why the Problem of Evil is so Intractable
The majority of philosophers of religion, at least since Plantinga’s reply to Mackie’s logical problem of evil, agree that it is logically possible for an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God to exist who permits some of the evils we see in the actual world. This is conceivable essentially because of the possible world known as heaven. That is, heaven is an imaginable world in a similar way that logically possible scenarios in any fiction are imaginable. However, like some of the imaginable stories in fiction where we are asked to envision an immoral act as a moral one, we resist. I will employ the works of Tamar Gendler on imaginative resistance and Keith Buhler’s Virtue Ethics approach to moral imaginative resistance and apply them to the conception of heaven and the problem of evil. While we can imagine God as an omnibenevolent parent permitting evil to allow for morally significant freedom and the rewards in heaven or punishments in hell (both possible worlds), we should not. This paper is not intended to be a refutation of particular theodicies; rather it provides a very general groundwork connecting issues of horrendous suffering and imaginative resistance to heaven as a possible world.
Copyright (c) 2018 Kramer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Political Decay and Political Arcadianism
An account of evil in classical political theory is the concept of evil government. The notion of political decay from good to evil government or to anarchy, the absence of government, among classical political theorists represents both a moral and a political problem. This essay argues that political decay remains a perennial problem because the political condition itself involves the seeds to its own destruction. Moreover, it is claimed that the nostalgic longing to a glorious past for nations or peoples risks turning into what is here labelled ‘political arcadianism’, fostering futile attempts to return to past conditions. The argument is that political arcadianism when focusing on the imagined past rather than the present is a possible cause of political decay.
Copyright (c) 2018 Hjorth https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
On the Relevance of the Concept of Intrinsic Evil: Francisco Suárez and Contemporary Catholic Virtue Ethics Approaches
The article explores the relevancy of the concept of intrinsic evil/intrinsically evil acts in contemporary Catholic theological ethics as a particular way of giving an account of (moral) evil. The argument proceeds in two steps. In the first step the author turns to Francisco Suárez as one of the first theologians who tried to deal with the concept of intrinsic evil in an extensive and systematic way. The point of this historical exploration is to determine the meanings of this concept as it started to appear more frequently in the ethical discourse. In the next step the author presents two contemporary positions within Catholic theological ethics, those of Joseph Selling and Dana Dillon. Although both authors are proponents of virtue ethics, they disagree fundamentally on the role of the concept of intrinsic evil within this approach. While Joseph Selling argues in favour of eliminating this concept from theological ethics, Dana Dillon posits that theological ethics cannot function without it. In the rest of the article, the author explores this disagreement through various ways in which the concept can be used, while taking into account the aforementioned meanings of the concept. In the end, the author sides with Joseph Selling, since the concept of intrinsic evil does not seem to be able to fulfil the role it was assigned within Catholic theological ethics.
Copyright (c) 2018 Polgar https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Evil as a Distortion of Communication: On Hegel’s account of Evil as Subjectivism
The early Hegel’s conception of evil draws on a very different paradigm than the current philosophical discourse on evil and therefore challenges received assumptions and can give us fresh impulses. In this paper, I first present Hegel’s conception of evil through a close reading of the Jenaer Realphilosophie’s, prima facie, obscure claim that evil is the ’internal actual, absolute certainty of itself, the pure night of being for itself‘. Hegel discusses evil because he worries how Romanticism and the romantic ideal of authenticity impact the possibility of communication. I then develop the idea that evil is a distortion of communication. I argue that this account of evil helps us to distinguish between evil and mere moral badness. Finally, I address two problems for this account, and discuss its limits.
Copyright (c) 2018 Sticker https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
From the Editors: De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics
Copyright (c) 2018 Ehnberg https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2017 Ehnberg https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2017 Svensson https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Neutrality, Partiality, and Meaning in Life
Discussion of whether values and norms are neutral or not has mainly appeared in works on the nature of prudential rationality and morality. Little systematic has yet appeared in the up and coming field of the meaning of life. What are the respects in which the value of meaningfulness is neutral or, in contrast, partial, relational, or ‘biased’? In this article, I focus strictly on answering this question. First, I aim to identify the salient, and perhaps exhaustive, respects in which issues of neutrality arise in the contexts of life’s meaning. In addition to providing a taxonomy of the key points of contention, a second aim is to advance reflection about them by considering the most important arguments that have been marshalled in favour of one side or the other, particularly as they appear in recent neutral positions. I conclude that meaning in life is neutral with respect to time but not any other conditions such as agents and patients, with a third aim being to point out that this makes the value of meaning different from the kinds of non/neutrality encountered in some salient conceptions of prudence and morality.
Copyright (c) 2017 Metz https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Meaning in Life and the Metaphysics of Value
According to subjectivist views about a meaningful life, ones life is meaningful in virtue of desire satisfaction or feelings of fulfilment. Standard counterexamples consist of satisfaction found through trivial or immoral tasks. In response to such examples, many philosophers require that the tasks one is devoted to are objectively valuable, or have objectively valuable consequences. I argue that the counterexamples to subjectivism do not require objective value for meaning in life. I also consider other reasons for thinking that meaning in life requires objective value and raise doubts about their strength. Finally, I argue that beauty is not plausibly objective, but that it seems important for meaning. This puts pressure on the objectivist to explain why objectivity matters in the case of other values.
Copyright (c) 2017 Evers https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
A Subjectivist Account of Life’s Meaning
In this paper, I propose and defend a particular desire-based theory of what makes a person’s life meaningful. Desire-based theories avoid the problems facing other theories of meaning in life: in contrast to objectivist theories (both consequentialist and non-consequentialist ones), they succeed in providing a necessary link between what makes a person’s life meaningful and the person’s own set of attitudes or concerns; in contrast to hybrid theories (or subjectivist theories with a value requirement), they avoid the elitism or exclusivism inherent in the former; and in contrast to mental-state theories, they avoid the problem of not taking the state of the world properly into account when determining whether someone’s life is meaningful. However, meaningfulness does not plausibly depend on the satisfaction of just any desires—perhaps especially not on the satisfaction of desires that we experience as alien to ourselves. I therefore suggest that the meaning in your life depends on the extent to which your categorical desires (i.e. those desires that are partly constitutive of your practical identity) are satisfied or fulfilled. In the final section of the paper, I respond to at least four possible objections to this view.
Most philosophers writing on meaning in life agree that it is a distinct kind of final value. This consensus view has two components: the ‘final value claim’ that meaning in life is a kind of final value, and the ‘distinctness claim’ that it is distinct from all other kinds of final value. This paper discusses some difficulties in vindicating both claims at once. One way to underscore the distinctness of meaning, for example, is to retain a feature of our pre-theoretical concept of meaning in life, according to which the least possible quantity of meaning is meaninglessness. Unfortunately, this makes it harder to defend the claim that meaning is a kind of final value. On the other hand, revising the concept to allow for negative meaning renders meaning closer in structure to other kinds of final value, but also makes it harder to defend the distinctness claim. In light of these difficulties, the paper explores the prospects of a theory of meaning in life which departs from the consensus view by rejecting the final value claim. On such a view, the value of meaning in life is entirely instrumental.
Copyright (c) 2017 Woodard https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Unethical Laws and Lawless Ethics: Right and Virtue in Kant’s Rechtslehre
In this paper, I examine the relation between law and morality within the context of Kant’s late work The Metaphysics of Morals. I argue that Kant’s conception of the law is based on a fundamental distinction between Right and Virtue, which respectively correspond to his legal-political theory and moral philosophy. My analysis is two part: in the first part, I examine the relationship between the Doctrines of Right and Virtue within the Kantian architectonic; in the second, I evaluate two cases of adjudication in the Rechtslehre that exemplify the distinction between law and morality explicated in the preceding section. I begin by showing that Kant’s legal and moral philosophies are normatively distinct, insofar as Right and Virtue belong to incommensurable realms of freedom and necessity. From this distinction, I derive Kant’s conception of the legal state as principally concerned with external freedoms and the preservation of the lawful condition itself. The second part of this paper analyzes Kant’s views on two cases of criminal justice, revealing his prioritization of the political over independent ethical considerations in juridical decision-making. Here, the conceptual barrier between law and morality serves as a caveat against facile recourses to Kantian ethics as means of legitimizing juridico-political decisions.
Copyright (c) 2017 Zhang https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Wage Desert and the Success of Organisations
People often apply the concept of desert when deciding how to respond to various circumstances and they believe it is appropriate and morally required that they do so. More specifically, desert has long been a prominent (if not the paramount) feature of discussions concerning just compensation. In this essay I argue that providing employees the compensation (remuneration) they deserve – that is, realising wage desert – is essential to demonstrating adequate respect for employees, which, in turn, greatly facilitates the ability of organisations to attract and retain qualified, competent employees and provides employees with a powerful motivation for performing to the best of their ability. In so doing, wage desert offers an effective means for helping to secure and maintain an organisation’s capacity to function as desired and, by extension, be successful. Hence, both for moral and prudential reasons it seems preferable for all involved that the concept of desert be used when determining employee remuneration.
Copyright (c) 2017 Young https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
From the Editors: De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics (German)
Copyright (c) 2017 Agnafors https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
From the Editors: De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics (English)
Copyright (c) 2017 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Laws against sexual obscenity rely on a distinction between explicit materials that merely offend and materials that cause something worse than offense. While most offensive content is protected under the banner of freedom of expression, obscenity is not. In this paper I try to locate a distinctive harm in the case of obscenity, that would justify prohibiting this material while permitting other kinds of offensive content. I argue that the best case for laws against obscenity relies on the concept of moral harm. If we rely on Mill’s Harm Principle and moral harm is a real harm, then it could be used to justify the distinction between protected and unprotected sexually explicit speech. I argue this demonstrates a weakness in the Harm Principle as a liberal principle of justice. By giving weight to moral harm, Mill’s principle risks eroding an important distinction between the public and private domains.
Copyright (c) 2017 Kessler https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Towards a Legal Turn in the Ethics of Immigration
This contribution presents the case for a ‘legal turn’ in the ethical debate on immigration. The legal turn is an invitation directed mainly at philosophers to take law as a normative practice seriously, to draw upon the normative resources which it entails and to look for cooperation opportunities with legal scholars. In the continuation of the debates on the ethics of immigration, this legal turn represents an important opportunity for philosophy to gain more relevance in the legal and political realms by affirming its capacity to inspire and guide concrete legal evolutions. This piece proposes both a methodological argument on how to make room for the contributions made by ethical theory within a legal argument and an exemplification of this innovative approach as a way to uncover new research fields for both immigration law and ethics. This legal turn represents a promising development of the consistency-based approach used widely by philosophers arguing from the point of view of liberal and democratic values and highlighting inconsistency in immigration policy. The legal turn pleads for a new locus for ethical investigation (namely immigration law) and proposes a methodology labelled as a ‘normative reflexive dialogue’. The potential of this dialogue will be exemplified through the principle of proportionality, a decisive principle for migration law and ethics.
Copyright (c) 2017 Rochel https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2016 Behrensen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Utilitarianism and Animal Cruelty: Further Doubts
Utilitarianism has an apparent pedigree when it comes to animal welfare. It supports the view that animal welfare matters just as much as human welfare. And many utilitarians support and oppose various practices in line with more mainstream concern over animal welfare, such as that we should not kill animals for food or other uses, and that we ought not to torture animals for fun. This relationship has come under tension from many directions. The aim of this article is to add further considerations in support of that tension. I suggest three ways in which utilitarianism comes significantly apart from mainstream concerns with animal welfare. First, utilitarianism opposes animal cruelty only when it offers an inefficient ratio of pleasure to pain; while this may be true of eating animal products, it is not obviously true of other abuses. Second, utilitarianism faces a familiar problem of the inefficacy of individual decisions; I consider a common response to this worry, and offer further concerns. Finally, the common utilitarian argument against animal cruelty ignores various pleasures that humans may get from the superior status that a structure supporting exploitation confers.
Copyright (c) 2016 Davies https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Transworld Egoism, Empathy, and the Golden Rule
According to preferentism, the ‘desire theory’ of well-being, one is made better off to the extent that her preferences, or desires, are satisfied. According to narrow preferentism, preferentism as it has traditionally been understood, the preferences that matter in this regard are just actual preferences; preferences we might ‘easily have had’, do not matter. On this account also, only actual preference satisfaction contributes to well-being. Merely possible preference satisfaction, including the ‘real possibility’ of attaining desired states of affairs, does not contribute to well-being. Broad preferentism makes sense of the intuition that feasibility as such contributes to well-being. On this account, we are made better off not only by the actual satisfaction of our actual preferences but also by the mere feasibility of satisfying preferences that we ‘might easily have had’. In addition to making sense of our intuition that feasibility as such, contributes to our well-being, broad preferentism provides a rationale for altruistic behavior. On this account support policies that benefit worldmates whose actual circumstances are different from our own because their circumstances are the our circumstances at nearby possible worlds, and our circumstances at other possible worlds, affect our own actual well-being.
Copyright (c) 2016 Baber https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Ecological Limits and the Meaning of Freedom: A Defense of Liberty as Non-Domination
It is now widely acknowledged that global environmental problems raise pressing social and political issues, but relatively little philosophical attention has been paid to their bearing on the concept of liberty. This must surprise us, because the question of whether environmental policies are at odds with individual liberty is bound to be controversial in the political arena. First, this article explains why a thorough philosophical debate about the relation between liberty and environmental constraints is needed. Second, based on Philip Pettit’s typology of liberty, it assesses how different conceptions of liberty fare in a context of stringent ecological limits. Indeed, a simple conceptual analysis shows that some conceptions of liberty are more compatible than others with such limits, and with the policies necessary to avoid overshooting them. The article concludes that Pettit’s conception of liberty as non-domination is more compatible with the existence of stringent ecological limits than the two alternatives considered.
Copyright (c) 2016 Fragnière https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2016 Agnafors https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Run the Experiment, Publish the Study, Close the Sale: Business, Values, Science and Biomedical Research – A Thematic Introduction
Business models for biomedical research prescribe decentralization due to market selection pressures. I argue that decentralized biomedical research does not match four normative philosophical models of the role of values in science. Non-epistemic values affect the internal stages of for-profit biomedical science. Publication planning, effected by Contract Research Organizations, inhibits mechanisms for transformative criticism. The structure of contracted research precludes attribution of responsibility for foreseeable harm resulting from methodological choices. The effectiveness of business strategies leads to over-representation of profit values versus the values of the general public. These disconnects in respect to the proper role of values in science results from structural issues ultimately linked to the distinct goals of business versus applied science, and so it seems likely that disconnects will also be found in other dimensions of attempts to combine business and science. The volume and integration in the publishing community of decentralized biomedical research imply that the entire community of biomedical research science cannot match the normative criteria of community-focused models of values in science. Several proposals for changing research funding structure might successfully relieve market pressures that drive decentralization.
Copyright (c) 2016 Quinn https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
The Good Bishop and the Explanation of Political Authority
A central problem of political philosophy is that of explaining how a state could have the moral authority to enforce laws, promulgate laws which citizens are thereby obliged to obey, give new duties to citizens and levy taxes. Many rival solutions to this problem of political authority have been offered by contemporary and recent philosophers but none has obtained wide acceptance. The current debate takes no cognisance of George Berkeley’s ‘Passive Obedience’, in which he defends the exceptionless duty of not using force to resist the state and offers a rule-consequentialist account of morality which indicates an explanation of political authority as grounded in the social connectedness of human beings. I expound, criticise and develop Berkeley’s explanation to provide a promising solution to the problem of political authority. The solution impugns the political authority of all existing states as well as the duty of passive obedience.
Copyright (c) 2016 Frederick https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Catholicism and Cosmopolitanism: the Confluence of Three Catholic Scholars and the Cosmopolitan Democrats on State Sovereignty and the Future of Global Governance
One of the central questions in international relations today is how we should conceive of state sovereignty. The notion of sovereignty—’supreme authority within a territory’, as Daniel Philpott defines it—emerged after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 as a result of which the late medieval crisis of pluralism was settled. But recent changes in the international order, such as technological advances that have spurred globalization and the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect, have cast the notion of sovereignty into an unclear light. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the current debate regarding sovereignty by exploring two schools of thought on the matter: first, three Catholic scholars from the past century—Luigi Sturzo, Jacques Maritain, and John Courtney Murray, S.J.—taken as representative of Catholic tradition; second, a number of contemporary political theorists of cosmopolitan democracy. The paper argues that there is a confluence between the Catholic thinkers and the cosmopolitan democrats regarding their understanding of state sovereignty and that, taken together, the two schools have much to contribute not only to our current understanding of sovereignty, but also to the future of global governance.
Copyright (c) 2016 Bagot https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Should We Ascribe Capabilities to Sentient Animals? A Critical Analysis of the Extension of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach
Originally, the Capabilities Approach had a strong anthropocentric orientation because of its focus on the entitlements of individual humans. However, as a part of the interest to employ it within animal and environmental ethics, it has been discussed whether the Capabilities Approach should consider also non-human life forms for their own sake. The most influential and elaborated contribution to this debate is Martha Nussbaum’s extension of the Capabilities Approach to include sentient animals. In this article, we argue that Nussbaum’s ascription of capabilities to animals is problematic, since the concept of a capability normally denotes an opportunity to choose between different functionings. When Nussbaum ascribes capabilities to animals, the concept seems to simply denote specific abilities. Such a use is problematic since it waters down the concept and makes it less meaningful, and it may obscure the fact that normal, adult humans, in contrast to sentient animals, can act as conscious moral agents. The aim of granting moral status to sentient animals can be achieved more convincingly by describing our moral relationship to animals in terms of the functionings we should promote, instead of ascribing capabilities to them. Originally, the Capabilities Approach had a strong anthropocentric orientation because of its focus on the entitlements of individual humans. However, as a part of the interest to employ it within animal and environmental ethics, it has been discussed whether the Capabilities Approach should consider also non-human life forms for their own sake. The most influential and elaborated contribution to this debate is Martha Nussbaum’s extension of the Capabilities Approach to include sentient animals. In this article, we argue that Nussbaum’s ascription of capabilities to animals is problematic, since the concept of a capability normally denotes an opportunity to choose between different functionings. When Nussbaum ascribes capabilities to animals, the concept seems to simply denote specific abilities. Such a use is problematic since it waters down the concept and makes it less meaningful, and it may obscure the fact that normal, adult humans, in contrast to sentient animals, can act as conscious moral agents. The aim of granting moral status to sentient animals can be achieved more convincingly by describing our moral relationship to animals in terms of the functionings we should promote, instead of ascribing capabilities to them.
Copyright (c) 2016 Melin, Kronlid https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Does Global Justice Require More than Just Global Institutions?
The ‘institutional approach’ to justice holds that persons’ responsibility of justice is primarily to support, maintain, and comply with the rules of just institutions. Within the rules of just institutions, so long as their actions do not undermine these background institutions, individuals have no further responsibilities of justice. But what does the institutional approach say in the non-ideal context where just institutions are absent, such as in the global case? One reading of the institutional approach, in this case, is that our duties are primarily to create just institutions, and that when we are doing our part in this respect, we may legitimately pursue other personal or associational ends. This ‘strong’ reading of our institutional duty takes it to be both a necessary and sufficient duty of justice of individuals that they do their part to establish just arrangements. But how plausible is this? On the one hand this requirement seems overly inflexible; on the other it seems overly lax. I clarify the motivation and context of this reading of the institutional duty, and suggest that it need not be as implausible as it seems.
Copyright (c) 2016 Tan https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2016 Namli https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Globalisation and Global Justice - A Thematic Introduction
Globalisation involves both promising potentials and risks. It has the potential – through the spread of human rights, the migration of people and ideas, and the integration of diverse economies – to improve human wellbeing and enhance the protection of human rights worldwide. But globalisation also incurs risks: global environmental risks (such as global warming), the creation of new centres of power with limited legitimacy, a ‘race to the bottom’ regarding workers’ safety and rights, risky journeys of thousands of migrants and not least growing global inequalities. Globalisation, therefore, is a key factor for today’s discussions of justice. As globalisation connects people, it also raises associated responsibilities between them. Until recently, the interest in justice among political philosophers and social ethicists was mainly focused on the nation state. However, this is no longer feasible. Since economic globalisation affects how wealth and power are distributed globally it has become indispensable to discuss social ethics in a global context and to develop principles of global justice. Global justice, therefore, entails an assessment of the benefits and burdens of the structural relations and institutional arrangements that constitute and govern globalisation. The academic discussion of global justice is vibrant and expanding. In my introduction I provide an overview of the discussions on global poverty, justice, cosmopolitanism and statism, migration, the capability approach and different dimensions of global justice.
Copyright (c) 2016 Collste https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Global Responsibility and the Enhancement of Life
This article advances a conception of global ethics in terms of the centrality of responsibility to the moral life and also the moral good of the enhancement of life. In contrast to some forms of global ethics, the article also seeks to warrant the use of religious sources in developing such an ethics. Specifically, the article seeks to demonstrate the greater adequacy of a global ethics of responsibility for the enhancement of life against rival conceptions developed in terms of Human Rights discourse or the so-called Capabilities Approach. The article ends with a conception of ‘conscience’ as the mode of human moral being and the experience of religious transcendence within the domains of human social and historical life. From this idea, conscience is specified a human right and capacity to determine the humane use of religious resources and also the norm for the rejection of inhumane expressions of religion within global ethics.
Copyright (c) 2016 Schweiker https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Global Justice in Lutheran Political Theology
The purpose of this article is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to the discourse on global justice. The article offers a critical examination of three different theories of global justice within political philosophy. Contractarian theories are criticized, and a thesis is that it is plausible to argue that justice can be understood as liberation from oppression. From this perspective the article gives an analysis of an influential theory of justice within Lutheran ethics. According to this theory justice is not an equal distribution but an arrangement where the subordinate respect the authority of those in power. This theory is related to a sharp distinction between law and gospel. The main thesis of the article is that Lutheran political theology should take a different approach if it aims to give a constructive contribution to theories of justice. This means that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology.
Copyright (c) 2016 Grenholm https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Talents in the Service of Justice: Responding to Unequal Ownership beyond Compliance
Over the past few decades, economic inequalities have continued to grow in most countries and the world is still lacking effective global tax schemes or corresponding structures of global distributive justice. Thus, for the world’s top-owners, simply complying with the existing rules hardly suffices as a virtue of justice. In the current article, G. A. Cohen’s nation-centered account of individual virtues in the service of distributive justice is elaborated further in a broader perspective. First, Cohen’s basic insights into the virtues of the talented rich are reconsidered under the conditions of highly unequal Western democracies in the global age as recently depicted by Thomas Piketty. Second, it is asked with reference to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, if the exceptional generosity of some superrich people can serve as a proper response to the assumed deficit of justice. Third, an ethic of generous compliance is outlined as a possible mediating approach in the discussion of the responsibilities of the talented rich in an age of high economic, health, and capability inequalities as well as public sector austerity.
Copyright (c) 2016 Päivänsalo https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2015 Namli https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Introduction. Capitalism: Theological Perspectives and Critiques
Copyright (c) 2015 Messer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
‘Justice and Right’: Biblical Ethics and the Regulation of Capitalism
The Hebrew expression in the Old Testament mishpat u-tsedaqa, conventionally translated ‘justice and righteousness’, has a particular application to the social responsibility of the king. The state, in the person of the king, is seen in the Old Testament as having an obligation to exercise its power on behalf of the most vulnerable. This may be illustrated by the widespread evidence from the ancient Near East of administrative and judicial action undertaken by kings to cancel debts, provide for the release of debt slaves, remit taxes, order the return of distrained property, and so forth. Although the impact of such measures would have been limited, and the tradition is attenuated in later levels of the text, the ideal of the state as the protector of the poor may be applied to the state’s relationship with the modern capitalist economy. It demands that the economy should be regulated to protect the most vulnerable against the impoverishment resulting from its transformation by globalized capitalism. The reality, however, especially in the UK and the US, is that the state colludes with capitalism to increase inequality and deepen poverty.
Copyright (c) 2015 Houston https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Ireland, Rent, and the Theologies of Real Estate
In this paper, taking the Irish economic crash of 2008 as the starting point, a theological response to real estate speculation is considered. By analysing the ways in which property development was a key factor in the collapse of the Irish economy, the flaws of such markets in crisis are exposed. Yet ethical concerns persist even when real estate markets are stable. Drawing on the Christian tradition around usury, an argument is made that an appropriate ecclesial reaction to the problems created by economies largely driven by real estate speculation involves developing alternative modes of conceiving land and economy. By drawing on the Vineyard song of Isaiah 5, a claim is made that faithful Christian practice demands a response of economic experimentation around property driven by a telos other than profit.
Copyright (c) 2015 Hargaden https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Time for Business: Business Ethics, Sustainability, and Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Messianic Time’
Contemporary business continues to intensify its radical relation to time. The New York Stock Exchange recently announced that in pursuing (as traders call it) the ‘race to zero’ they will begin using laser technology originally developed for military communications to send information about trades nearly at the speed of light. This is just one example of short-term temporal rhythms embedded in the practices of contemporary firms which watch their stock price on an hourly basis, report their earnings quarterly, and dissolve future consequences and costs through discounting procedures. There is reason to believe that these radical conceptions of time and its passing impair the ability of businesses to function in a morally coherent manner. In the spirit of other recent critiques of modern temporality such as David Couzen Hoys The Time of Our Lives, in this paper, I present a critique of the temporality of modern business. In response, I assess the recent attempt to provide an alternative account of temporality using theological concepts by Giorgio Agamben. I argue that Agamben’s more integrative account of messianic time provides a richer ambitemporal account which might provide a viable temporality for a new sustainable economic future.
Copyright (c) 2015 Kidwell https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
The Rise of Religion and the Future of Capitalism
The rise of religion and the rise of capitalism are currently occurring in roughly the same geographical regions (Latin America, Asia, and Africa). Although both religion and capitalism are often ignored, or are regarded negatively, within development circles, this article reflects on their potential for human wellbeing when they convergence. Its focus is on the socio-economic significance of what the author calls the Evangelical Pentecostal Charismatic Movement (EPCM), which accounts for most of the growth of Christianity, the world’s largest religion. He argues that the movement’s stimulation of selfempowerment (especially of women), church-based social outreach, and the encouragement of trust are of particular significance. They provide ample grounds, he contends, for revisiting the question Max Weber is famous for having posed about the link between religious belief and economic behaviour. They also help overcome victimhood mentalities and promote good stewardship, accountability and integrity. The EPCM thereby acts as a progressive force that, in serving the common good, stands to make a positive contribution to the future of capitalism.
Copyright (c) 2015 Heslam https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
From the Editors (GER): De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics
Copyright (c) 2015 Agnafors https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Trolleys and Transplants: Derailing the Distinction Between Doing and Allowing
Two key elements in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s most recent response to the famed Trolley Problem produce a tension that threatens to undermine her account. First, in a reversal of part of her 1985 position, Thomson now argues that a bystander is not permitted to divert a threat. Second, her use of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA) to explain intuitions about the permissibility of threat diversion conflicts with her constraint of an agent’s available options to the present tense, which is designed to prevent past bad acts from justifying bad acts in the present. I contend that the conflict between DDA and the tense constraint creates an inconsistency in Thomson’s current position and supports the conclusion that no one, including the trolley driver, is permitted to turn the trolley. In order to resolve this conflict, Thomson must either abandon one of the core features of her explanation or reject a fundamental intuition driving the Trolley Problem, that the driver may divert the trolley to save lives.
Copyright (c) 2015 Duncan https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
The Scope of the Global Institutional Order: Can Pogge Survive Cohen’s Critique of Rawls?
In this paper, I develop a critique of Thomas Pogge”s attempt in Realizing Rawls to expand the scope of the Original Position. I argue that Pogge is guilty of assuming the same arbitrary boundary between public and private behaviours made by Rawls. To actualize this critique, I take G. A. Cohen’s critique of John Rawls, found in its fullest form in Rescuing Justice and Equality, alongside Thomas Pogge”s attempt, in Realizing Rawls, to expand the scope of the Original Position. Cohen argues that the boundary Rawls wishes to draw between the public and private cannot be coherently maintained in the application of the Difference Principle. I argue that if this claim is true, then Pogge”s attempt to expand the scope of Rawls” Theory of Justice to the international arena is actually considerably more radical than Pogge intended. Not only do we need to worry about the justice of institutions in international law, but we now need to worry about the justice of individual actions inside a system of global justice. I conclude by considering some objections against Cohen”s, and thus, my position.
Copyright (c) 2015 Gray https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
From the Editors (ENG): De Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics
Copyright (c) 2015 Behrensen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Humanitarian Intervention and Moral Responsibility
This essay investigates the moral aspects of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention involves the balancing of at least three sometimes contradictory principles – the autonomy of states, the prohibition of war and the reduction of harm and human suffering – and hence requires not merely a legal and political approach to the matter but renders a moral viewpoint necessary. It is argued that P.F. Strawson’s concept Moral Reactive Attitudes MRA) contributes to analysing the moral dilemmas and priorities involved. First, MRA underlines the moral aspects of international society that are essential for dealing with the moral conflict inherent in international society. Secondly, MRA helps to balance between competing claims of justification and legitimacy in cases of humanitarian intervention.
Copyright (c) 2015 Hjorth https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
An Ethical Outlook on The Influence of Memory on Violence
As we witness the growing popularity of what it referred to as memory discourse within the fields of historical and cultural studies, it becomes apparent that there is a lack of systematic insight into the ethical dimension of this subject. This paper attempts to alleviate this imbalance. In the first section, the author scrutinizes the relationship between memory and violence. This has appeared in human history as a very real and multifaceted issue but remains under-explored in philosophy and theology. Given the vibrant nature and moral fickleness of memory, in the second section, the author outlines some ethical requirements that should regulate the use of memory. Epistemological, pedagogical and practical aspects of memory are taken into consideration within a comprehensive, broader social context, as well as individual demands. Presuming that memory can be a valuable ingredient for a good life, the author reconsiders the ethical criteria for memory, which should not just prevent violence but also stimulate tolerance and cohabitation.
Copyright (c) 2015 ?urkovi ? Nimac https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
In Defence of Just War: Christian Tradition, Controversies, and Cases
This article presents four controversial issues that are raised by the articulation of just war thinking in my book, In Defence of War (2013, 2014): the conception of just war as punitive, the penultimate nature of the authority of international law, the morality of national interest, and the elasticity of the requirement of proportionality. It then proceeds to illustrate the interpretation of some of the criteria of just war in terms of three topical cases: Britain’s belligerency against Germany in 1914, the Syrian rebellion against the Assad regime in 2011, and Israe’s Operation Protective Edge against Hamas in Gaza in 2013. It is often claimed that just war thinking has been rendered obsolete by novel phenomena such as nuclear weapons, wars ‘among the people’, war-by-remote-control, and cyber-aggression. The presentation of issues and cases in this article, notwithstanding its brevity, is sufficient to show that just war thinking continues to develop by wrestling with controversial conceptual problems and thinking its way through novel sets of circumstances.
Copyright (c) 2015 Biggar https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
After some historical remarks about former examples of Targeted killing the paper asks about the paradigm in which targeted killing could fit: punishment, police action, war of which the latter one seems to be the most promising. In this context, the problem of Immunity of non-combatants and who is to be counted as such becomes relevant.
Copyright (c) 2015 Wolbert https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Enhancing Humans and Sustainability: The Reunion of Bioethics and Environmental Ethics
Emerging technologies are hyped as ‘transformative’ by their proponents, who prophesize that these new technologies will significantly and beneficially change our world. Concerns have been raised about the potential environmental impacts of these technologies. Emerging technologies and their implications on humans, society, and the environment challenge our understanding of our responsibilities to the environment and future generations. Utilizing Van Potter’s sense of bioethics that meant the normative study of humanity’s place in the biosphere, I attempt to reintegrate bioethics and environmental ethics, to address questions about human well-being in the future, its dependence on complex environmental systems, and the impact of emerging technologies particularly enhancement technologies upon it. Ultimately, I argue that the future envisioned by proponents of human enhancement technologies is not consistent with our responsibilities to future generations which including leaving certain amounts of natural capital, including human ones.
Copyright (c) 2014 Joan McGregor https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not have to be. At its heart, the free will debate is a metaethical debate - a debate about the meaning of certain moral terms - free will, moral responsibility, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness. Compatibilists argue that these concepts are compatible with wholly deterministic world, while incompatibilists argue that these concepts require indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. However, compatibilists and incompatibilists do not disagree on everything - both parties agree that free will and moral responsibility require control - the kind of control that we believe we have over the majority of our everyday actions. Over the course of any given day each of us makes countless choices, and in most situations as we make these choices we cannot help but believe that we are in control of them - that our actions are free and we are morally responsible for them. Here I argue that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility are inexorably tied to this experience of apparent liberty.
Copyright (c) 2014 William Simkulet https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2014 Marcus Agnafors https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Climate Migration and the State’s Duty to Protect
Climate change will have as a consequence a more or less important rise of global sea levels. For some countries, this is likely to mean their total disappearance, if no measures are taken. Some of these measures might be too costly for the country to finance and its population will have no other choice but to migrate to another country. This contribution considers this kind of problem from the point of view of political philosophy. My arguments will rest on two fundamental assumptions. On the one hand, we find the state’s duty to protect its citizens against internal and external dangers, and on the other, the individual’s right not to have to migrate. Each state must protect its own citizens against foreign dangers. It will also be assumed that no state has a right to endanger the very existence of another state. The contribution aims to show some of the major consequences of these assumptions for the ethical problem of migration due to the consequences of human-induced climate change.
Copyright (c) 2014 Norbert Campagna https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2014 Maren Behrensen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Environmental Ethics as a Question of Environmental Ontology: Naess’ Ecosophy T and Buddhist Traditions
Arne Naess included several references to Buddhist teachings in his ecophilosophy. I suggest an inquiry into and interpretation of the Buddhist sources of Naess’ proposal, in order to understand the role Buddhist elements play in it, and how they can offer a further understanding of central elements in Naess’ ecosophy. The focus is on the union of theory, worldview and practice, which lies at the core of both fields. A particular emphasis is placed on the idea that only a change of outlook on the nature of reality can promote an ethical transformation. In Naess’ approach, the ecological crisis is first of all a problem of our experience of the world, posing a question of ‘environmental ontology’. I suggest an hermeneutical approach primarily into early Indian Buddhist sources, and I argue that although a homogeneous ‘Buddhism’, as well as a ‘green Buddhism’ are problematic, different strands of thinking in Buddhist philosophy can facilitate the analysis of critical points also raised by Ecosophy T, supporting and expanding an ecosophical approach to ecological challenges.
Copyright (c) 2014 Elisa Cavazza https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Do No Harm: A Cross-Disciplinary, Cross-Cultural Climate Ethics
Anthropogenic climate change has become a hot button issue in the scientific, economic, political, and ethical sectors. While the science behind climate change is clear, responses in the economic and political realms have been unfulfilling. On the economic front, companies have marketed themselves as pioneers in the quest to go green while simultaneously engaging in environmentally destructive practices and on the political front, politicians have failed to make any significant global progress. I argue that climate change needs to be framed as an ethical issue to make serious progress towards the path to a sustainable human civilization. In an effort to motivate the urgency needed to confront climate change, I argue that climate change seriously affects human beings living here and now, and if one cares about unnecessarily harming fellow innocent living human beings, then one should care about one’s own environmental impact related to climate change. Since this argument does not depend upon any specific philosophical, religious, or ethical tradition but applies regardless of one’s particular background, I hope to induce genuine concern among all human beings regarding this issue.
Copyright (c) 2014 Casey Rentmeester https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2014 Eric Brandstedt https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Understanding Climate Change as an Existential Threat: Confronting Climate Denial as a Challenge to Climate Ethics
Climate change cannot be managed by experts and politicians alone. Consequently, climate ethics must take up the challenge of inviting public responsibility on this issue. New sociological research on climate denial by Kari Norgaard, however, suggests that most citizens of industrialized countries are ill-prepared to cope with the ethical significance of climate change. I draw upon Martin Heidegger to offer a new reading of climate denial that suggests viable responses to this problem. I argue that the implications of climate change are largely received as an ‘existential threat’ to the extent that they endanger the integrity of everyday existence. In other words, the implications of climate change for everyday life unsettle what phenomenologists call the ‘lifeworld’. Should basic lifeworld assumptions, which cultures rely on to makes sense of the world and their purposes in it, come under serious question, anxieties surface that most people are profoundly motivated to avoid. Hence, the ethical obligations entailed by climate change are ‘denied’ in the form of protecting lifeworld integrity for the sake of containing anxieties that would otherwise overwhelm people. Finally, I submit that existential approaches to climate denial can empower a confrontation with ‘climate anxiety’ in ways that open up ethical reflection.
Copyright (c) 2014 Tim Christion Myers https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Climate Change, Human Rights and the Problem of Motivation
In this paper, I discuss some of the human rights that are threatened by the impact of global warming and the problem of motivation to comply with the duties of climate justice. I explain in what sense human rights can be violated by climate change and try to show that there are not only moral reasons to address this problem, but also more prudential motives, which I refer to as quasi-moral and non-moral reasons. I also assess some implications of potentially catastrophic impacts driven by this ecological issue. My aim is to locate, by outlining a normative perspective based on sound empirical findings, urgent climate injustices, and explain why well-off citizens in developed countries have strong reasons to avert the potentially massive violation of the rights of present and future victims of climate change.
Copyright (c) 2014 Michel Bourban https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
An Ethics of Sustainability and Jewish Law?
This article addresses the issue of why it is important to ask for ethical responses to questions of sustainability and an ethics of an open future, and why the technocratic approach as practiced in most Western countries might not be sustainable. Second, it examines what a religious perspective has to offer for the discourse. In particular, this is the perspective of Jewish Law (halakhah); today a mere niche subject, a law system without territory and primarily based on the tradition of a religious minority. It is argued that despite these facts the Jewish legal system should be taken into account, as it offers a rich and unique tradition of more than 3,000 years of discussion and thought that still provides revealing insights. Two Jewish legal principles, bal tashchit and migrash exemplify this claim, before an outlook on possible contributions is given.
Copyright (c) 2014 Jann Reinhardt https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Climate Change and Responsibility to Future Generations: Reflections on the Normative Questions
Climate change raises in an important way the problem of moral responsibility. It forces us to recognise that we have a responsibility to future generations, and to ask what this responsibility implies. Here I identify four key normative questions: (1) How should we respond to uncertainty? Should we apply cost-benefit analysis in order to cope with uncertainty? (2) How should we evaluate the emission of greenhouse gases? Given that the effects of emissions will be bad, should we judge that we as emitters harm the receivers and by that do them an injustice? (3) How should we compare present costs and future benefits? Should we give little or much weight to the benefits and well-being of people in the further future? (4) How should we take heed of human rights? Should we try to avoid the adverse outcomes of a cost-benefit approach by adopting a human rights approach that specifies minimum thresholds to which all human beings are entitled?
Copyright (c) 2014 Robert Heeger https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2014 Brenda Almond https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0