Does Global Justice Require More than Just Global Institutions?
AbstractThe ‘institutional approach’ to justice holds that persons’ responsibility of justice is primarily to support, maintain, and comply with the rules of just institutions. Within the rules of just institutions, so long as their actions do not undermine these background institutions, individuals have no further responsibilities of justice. But what does the institutional approach say in the non-ideal context where just institutions are absent, such as in the global case? One reading of the institutional approach, in this case, is that our duties are primarily to create just institutions, and that when we are doing our part in this respect, we may legitimately pursue other personal or associational ends. This ‘strong’ reading of our institutional duty takes it to be both a necessary and sufficient duty of justice of individuals that they do their part to establish just arrangements. But how plausible is this? On the one hand this requirement seems overly inflexible; on the other it seems overly lax. I clarify the motivation and context of this reading of the institutional duty, and suggest that it need not be as implausible as it seems.
Cohen, G. A. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. DOI: 10.4159/9780674029651
Freeman, Samuel. Justice and the Social Contract. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Murphy, Liam. ‘Institutions and the Demands of Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1999), pp. 251-291. DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.1998.tb00071.x
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Right. Oxford: Polity Press, 2001.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Tan, Kok-Chor. Justice, Institutions and Luck. The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.001.0001
Young, Iris Marion. Responsibility for Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195392388.001.0001
How to Cite
Copyright (c) 2016 Tan
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.