Wage Desert and the Success of Organisations
AbstractPeople often apply the concept of desert when deciding how to respond to various circumstances and they believe it is appropriate and morally required that they do so. More specifically, desert has long been a prominent (if not the paramount) feature of discussions concerning just compensation. In this essay I argue that providing employees the compensation (remuneration) they deserve – that is, realising wage desert – is essential to demonstrating adequate respect for employees, which, in turn, greatly facilitates the ability of organisations to attract and retain qualified, competent employees and provides employees with a powerful motivation for performing to the best of their ability. In so doing, wage desert offers an effective means for helping to secure and maintain an organisation’s capacity to function as desired and, by extension, be successful. Hence, both for moral and prudential reasons it seems preferable for all involved that the concept of desert be used when determining employee remuneration.
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