Three Limitations of Reflective Equilibrium’s Justificatory Claims
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.269377Keywords:
John Rawls, Reflective Equilibrium, Iterative process, Cultural Contingency, Circular ReasoningAbstract
John Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium (RE) offers a non-foundationalist framework for moral and political justification by harmonizing considered judgments and principles through iterative recalibration. Positioned as a response to value pluralism and normative conflict, RE foregrounds coherence and internal consistency as its epistemic ideals. On three interlinked grounds, this paper offers a critical examination of RE. First, RE’s reliance on moral intuitions can obscure the socio-historical construction of moral sensibilities. This effectively undermines the claims of universal moral justification. Second, in absence of external normative anchors, its procedural dynamism risks justificatory circularity. Third, RE assumes equal degree of epistemic accessibility to everyone that is unevenly allocated across social situations, favouring individuals possessing the cognitive, educational, and material resources required for prolonged contemplation. This asymmetry renders RE susceptible to epistemic exclusion, marginalizing subaltern moral imaginaries and reinforcing dominant normative frameworks. Consequently, RE’s epistemic architecture narrows it aspiration to pluralism.
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